Optimizely Supply-Chain Attack Exposes Visitors of 178 Organizations to Malware

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Nov 18, 2026

A supply-chain attack involving website experimentation platform Optimizely exposed visitors of websites associated with 178 organizations to malicious code designed to steal cryptocurrency, capture payment card information, and target Apple mobile devices.

The incident was discovered on November 16, 2026, by British cybersecurity researcher Scott Helme, founder of Report URI, who identified malicious JavaScript injected into customer scripts hosted through Optimizely's content delivery network (CDN).

In his investigation, Helme found malicious code in 188 Optimizely script instances out of 1,611 examined, affecting websites associated with organizations including Zoom, HSBC, Equifax, CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce, IKEA, GitLab, Air France-KLM, Ledger, and Peacock.

Optimizely acknowledged the incident on November 17, confirming that an unauthorized party had exploited a vulnerability in its Web Experimentation platform to inject malicious code into customer website snippets.

The company said it had addressed the vulnerability, removed the unauthorized code, and taken additional steps to secure affected accounts and prevent further malicious activity.

The incident highlights the risks of relying on third-party software embedded in websites, as attackers were able to distribute malicious scripts through a service already integrated into the online infrastructure of multiple organizations.

How attackers exploited Optimizely's Web Experimentation platform

Optimizely provides digital experience and website experimentation tools that allow organizations to run A/B tests, personalize webpages, and evaluate changes to their websites.

To use its Web Experimentation service, customers embed a JavaScript snippet into their websites. The snippet connects to Optimizely's infrastructure and retrieves the code needed to run experiments and personalization features.

According to Helme's investigation, attackers gained unauthorized access to customer projects and injected malicious JavaScript into a field called Project JavaScript.

The modified scripts continued to be delivered through Optimizely's legitimate CDN, meaning visitors' browsers could receive the malicious code when loading websites that incorporated the affected snippets.

The compromise therefore did not require attackers to independently breach the internal infrastructure of every organization whose website contained an infected script.

Instead, they exploited a shared third-party service to reach visitors across multiple websites.

BleepingComputer later reported that Optimizely attributed the incident to a vulnerability in its Experimentation account-signup flow. The company reportedly blocked the vulnerable path and took additional measures to secure affected accounts.

It is important to distinguish this from a direct compromise of Optimizely's entire CDN infrastructure. The investigation found that the CDN was serving modified customer project code; it did not establish that the CDN itself had been independently compromised.

What the malicious scripts were designed to do

The injected JavaScript contained several capabilities targeting different types of information and devices.

The malware's behavior depended on the visitor's device, browser environment, and interactions with the affected webpage.

Cryptocurrency address swapping

One of the primary capabilities involved replacing legitimate cryptocurrency wallet addresses displayed on webpages with addresses controlled by the attackers.

The malicious script searched for cryptocurrency addresses and could modify webpage text, form fields, links, images, and clipboard contents.

This created an opportunity for attackers to intercept cryptocurrency transfers before users completed them.

For example, someone visiting a cryptocurrency-related website might copy a wallet address displayed on the page, believing it belonged to the intended recipient. If the malicious script replaced that address, the user could unknowingly send funds to an attacker-controlled wallet instead.

The investigation identified support for multiple cryptocurrency networks, including Bitcoin, Ethereum and other EVM-compatible networks, Solana, TRON, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Dogecoin.

This type of attack is particularly difficult for users to detect because the compromised webpage may otherwise appear legitimate.

Payment card skimming

The injected code also included functionality designed to capture payment card information entered into website forms.

The malicious script could collect card numbers, expiration dates, and security codes from affected webpage fields before transmitting the information to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

However, the investigation identified an important limitation: the malware could not access card fields inside separately hosted payment iframes, such as those used by Stripe and Adyen.

This means the exposure depended partly on how individual websites implemented their payment forms. It would therefore be inaccurate to conclude that every payment card entered on every affected website was compromised.

iOS exploit delivery

The attack also included exploit kits targeting Apple mobile devices.

Helme identified two exploit kits in the investigation: Coruna, which targeted devices running iOS versions 13 through 17, and DarkSword, which targeted devices running iOS 18.x.

The researchers also identified a separate payload targeting iOS 26 that, at the time of analysis, was used for device fingerprinting rather than deploying the same exploit chain.

These findings indicate that the campaign was not limited to cryptocurrency theft or payment information collection. It also sought to exploit vulnerabilities in mobile devices.

However, the presence of an exploit payload does not establish that every iPhone or iPad that visited an affected website was successfully compromised. Successful exploitation depended on the device's software version and the vulnerabilities involved.

The scripts could also collect other information, including webpage URLs, certain browser cookies, and screenshots of webpages.

178 organizations identified in the investigation

Report URI's findings provide an indication of the scale of the incident, although the numbers should be interpreted carefully.

Helme examined 1,611 distinct Optimizely scripts and identified 188 containing malicious code across 178 organizations.

The 188 figure refers to compromised script instances, not 188 separate companies. The 1,611 figure represents the scripts examined during the investigation, rather than every Optimizely script in circulation.

The researcher also cautioned that the actual number of affected organizations could be higher because the investigation was limited to the scripts he was able to identify and examine.

Among the organizations identified were companies operating across financial services, technology, media, retail, travel, and cryptocurrency infrastructure.

The inclusion of major brands does not mean that all of them experienced the same level of compromise.

Reuters reported that Equifax said it had found no evidence of compromise to its systems and that HSBC said unauthorized scripts were not active on its websites. Salesforce said it had disabled Optimizely scripts as a precaution while investigating, while Salesforce and IKEA were among organizations reviewing the incident.

The distinction matters because the discovery of malicious code in a website's third-party scripts does not automatically establish that the company's internal databases, networks, or customer accounts were breached.

Report URI also tracked cryptocurrency received by identified attacker wallets. Its initial monitoring identified approximately US$7,040 in cryptocurrency received during the reported period.

That figure represents funds observed in the identified wallets, not a confirmed estimate of total losses. The investigation did not establish the full number of successful victims or the overall financial damage caused by the campaign.

Optimizely acknowledges the incident and removes malicious code

Optimizely acknowledged the compromise on November 17, confirming that an unauthorized party had exploited a vulnerability in its Web Experimentation platform to inject malicious code into customer snippets.

The company said it had addressed the vulnerability, removed malicious code from affected projects, and taken steps to secure affected accounts.

Further reporting by BleepingComputer detailed additional remediation measures, including blocking the vulnerable signup path, ending active sessions, revoking tokens, resetting access for affected accounts, and preventing malicious code delivery.

Report URI's monitoring also documented a substantial cleanup during November 16. The number of infected snippets identified in its investigation fell from 188 to one by 21:52 UTC.

That observation indicates that most of the identified malicious scripts had been removed or corrected by that point. It does not, however, establish that every possible exposure or downstream consequence had been resolved.

Removing malicious code from a website's scripts cannot reverse information that may already have been collected or transactions that may already have been completed.

What visitors should do to protect their devices and accounts

People who visited affected websites during the exposure period should consider reviewing their device and account security, particularly if they entered payment information, copied cryptocurrency addresses, or used sensitive services.

The discovery of an infected script does not mean every visitor was compromised. Nevertheless, the nature of the payloads makes precautionary checks worthwhile.

For iPhone and iPad users

Apple device owners should install the latest iOS or iPadOS security updates available for their devices.

The exploit chains identified by Report URI targeted specific operating system versions, making security updates an important precaution for users who visited affected websites during the incident.

Users can check for available updates through Settings > General > Software Update.

For cryptocurrency holders

People who copied or transferred wallet addresses while visiting potentially affected websites should review their recent transactions.

Before sending cryptocurrency, users should independently verify the complete destination address rather than relying exclusively on information copied from a webpage or clipboard.

Hardware wallet users should compare the destination address displayed on the device itself against the intended recipient before approving a transaction.

This is particularly relevant to Ledger users, as the hardware wallet company was among the organizations identified in the investigation.

For people who entered payment card information

Users who entered payment card details into potentially affected website forms should review their bank and card statements for unfamiliar transactions.

Anyone who notices suspicious activity should contact their issuing bank promptly and follow its recommendations, which may include blocking or replacing the card.

The risk depends partly on how the website handled payment information, since the investigation found that separately hosted payment iframes were not accessible to the malicious script.

For users concerned about account exposure

People who accessed sensitive accounts during a potentially compromised visit should review recent login activity and active sessions.

If there is evidence of suspicious access, they should sign out of unfamiliar sessions, secure their accounts, and change affected credentials.

Clearing browser caches alone should not be treated as a reliable way to remove the consequences of a successful device exploit or recover information already stolen.

What the incident reveals about third-party website security

The Optimizely incident demonstrates how a vulnerability in a single software provider can create security risks across organizations that otherwise operate separate websites and infrastructure.

Third-party JavaScript has become a common part of modern web development. Organizations use externally hosted scripts for analytics, advertising, experimentation, customer support, and personalization.

While these integrations provide useful functionality, they also introduce dependencies that organizations must account for in their security strategies.

A compromised third-party script can execute within the context of a website that visitors already trust, potentially exposing information entered or displayed on that page.

Security measures such as properly enforced Content Security Policy (CSP), Subresource Integrity (SRI) where applicable, third-party script monitoring, and tighter access controls can help reduce these risks. However, no single measure guarantees protection against every form of supply-chain compromise.

For organizations, the incident underscores the importance of monitoring external software dependencies, limiting who can modify website scripts, and maintaining procedures to quickly disable third-party integrations when suspicious activity is detected.

For users, it is a reminder that a familiar brand name or legitimate website address does not necessarily guarantee that every component loaded by the webpage is safe.

The attack did not need to replace the websites of 178 organizations to reach their visitors. By compromising a shared software dependency, attackers found a way to turn trusted website functionality into a delivery channel for malicious code.

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